Abstract-Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary users, on a short-term basis. Primary users may need financial motivations to share spectrum, since they assume costs in obtaining spectrum licenses. Auctions are a natural revenue generating mechanism to apply. Recent design on spectrum auctions make the strong assumption that the primary user knows the probability distribution of user valuations. We study revenue-maximizing spectrum auctions in the more realistic priorfree setting, when information on user valuations is unavailable. A two-phase auction framework is constructed. In phase one, we design a strategyproof mechanism that computes a subset of users with an interference-free spectrum allocation, such that the potential revenue in the second phase is maximized. A tailored payment scheme ensures truthful bidding at this stage. The selected users then participate in phase two, where we design a randomized competitive auction and prove its strategyproofness through the argument of bid independence. Employing probabilistic techniques, we prove that our auction generates a revenue that is at least proven for similar settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless spectrum is a scarce commodity, whose usage is subject to regulations and policies drawn up by governmental institutions such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States. The outcome is a static model of spectrum allocation, where large wireless operators compete through auctions [2] . Winners in such auctions are granted long-term licences, and are known as primary spectrum users. Recent studies suggest that such static allocation is rather inefficient [1] , [8] . Spectrum utilization by primary users varies drastically, both geographically and temporally, with large areas and time periods without traffic. Unlicensed spectrum users, or secondary users, are faced with an artificial spectrum shortage [1] , [12] . Recently, dynamic spectrum allocation [1] , [6] , [12] has been proposed as a possible solution to this problem.
In the dynamic spectrum allocation model, a spectrum broker [13] , [14] periodically pools unused portions of spectrum together. Separate chunks of this spectrum is then leased to secondary users, on a short-term basis [6] , [14] . Recent studies have covered the design of fast spectrum allocation algorithms, and the feasibility and implementation issues of such a model [3] , [13] , [14] . However, a dynamic spectrum allocation protocol must realistically feature financial incentives for the primary user, since they accrue substantial costs in acquiring the spectrum license and in infrastructure [6] , [14] . It is therefore desirable to incorporate an appropriate revenue generating mechanism into dynamic spectrum allocation schemes. A classic method for raising revenue in markets with limited goods is auctions [7] . In supply-limited markets, the valuations by bidders for goods can be used by the auctioneer to set a pricing scheme, e.g. for achieving highest revenue. Furthermore, a well designed auction takes into account the possibility of strategic behaviour of bidders, who may misreport their true valuation, in the hopes of paying less for receiving the item. A strategyproof auction is one in which bidders have no incentive to lie about their true valuation [11] .
In this paper, we focus on the secondary spectrum market, where primary users lease spectrum to secondary users, using periodically held auctions. Such spectrum auctions have distinct spatial and temporal characteristics -secondary users are usually located in a geographically restricted area, and the spectrum lease is only valid for short durations [3] , [6] , [14] , [15] . The proximity among secondary users implies that the auctioneer needs to ensure the spectrum allocation is interference-free [3] , [6] , [15] . Optimal interference-free allocation of spectrum is equivalent to the NP-hard problem of graph-colouring. Efficient approximation algorithms for suboptimal solutions are therefore necessary in practice.
However, employing a sub-optimal solution interferes with the desired strategyproof property of the auction [10] . Zhou et al. [15] demonstrated that the well known Vickrey-ClarkeGroves auction [11] fails to illicit truthful bidding in spectrum auctions with interference effects. They proceed to design a strategyproof one, focusing on maximizing the aggregate utility of secondary users. Nevertheless, dynamic spectrum auctions should be revenue-maximizing, in order to incentivize primary users to (temporarily) relinquish spectrum access. Jia et al. [6] propose an auction framework that is strategyproof and explicitly considers interference effects. Following the de facto standard of revenue-maximizing auction design in the economics [7] , [9] , their mechanism requires the auctioneer to know probability distributions from which bidder valuations are drawn. This is a rather strong assumption, and is unlikely to hold in practical dynamic spectrum auctions. In such periodical, ephemeral auctions, a secondary user's valuation fluctuates over time, with little correlation. We are hence motivated to design a more pragmatic approach, where good revenuegenerating properties do not depend on prior information on user valuations. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to consider spectrum auctions in the prior-free setting.
We target a revenue-maximizing spectrum auction in this prior-free setting [4] , while explicitly taking into consideration the effects of interference. While our work is focused on dynamic spectrum auctions, our results and techniques may be of interest in other spectrum auction scenarios, where the key difficulty is the lack of information on bidder valuation. The proposed auction protocol is both fast and strategyproof: the algorithms run in polynomial time, and bidding truthfully is a provably dominant strategy for all users.
We consider interference-free allocation and revenuemaximization in two separate phases. In the first phase, we compute a feasible, interference-free channel assignment that potentially maximizes revenue based on the bids submitted by users. Only users with a channel assigned in the first phase remain in the auction. The second phase of the auction protocol consists of a strategyproof, randomized mechanism that computes a set of winners, who will receive the assigned channel at prices set to maximize revenue. While the second phase is strategyproof by design, the first phase is not intrinsically so. We resolve this problem by carefully tailoring a payment scheme to work with the assignment algorithm in the first phase, and prove its truthfulness. By treating the payments in the first phase as the minimum price a user must pay to win a channel in the second phase, we are able to ensure that the entire protocol is strategyproof.
We begin by discussing related literature in Sec. II. The setting and system model is introduced in Sec. III. We present the randomized revenue-maximizing mechanism in Sec. IV, and study the interference-free channel assignment in a strategyproof manner in Sec. V. Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Recent studies on spectrum occupancy rates showed that statically allocated spectrum utilization varies drastically, both in the spatial and temporal dimensions [8] . In recent years, dynamic spectrum allocation has been suggested as a viable solution to efficiently utilize and share the available spectrum [1] , [12] . Dynamic spectrum access may be uncoordinated, with secondary users using cognitive radios for spectrum sensing [1] . In contrast, the coordinated approach calls for a centralized entity, e.g., a spectrum broker, to pool and manage unused spectrum, and to lease them to secondary users periodically [13] , [14] .
Revenue-maximization for dynamic spectrum auctions was considered by Gandhi et al. [3] , who used a linear programming approach to model interference constraints. This work does not consider strategic user behavior, and assumes truthful bids for free. Strategic behaviour is considered by Sengupta and Chatterjee [13] , who propose a knapsack based auction for dynamic spectrum allocation. However, they do not address the problem of interference. We target an auction protocol that explicitly finds an interference-free spectrum allocation, while maximizing revenue in a strategyproof fashion.
In traditional economic theory, revenue-maximizing auctions, a.k.a. optimal auctions, are designed under the assumption that the auctioneer knows a probability distribution, from which bidder valuations are drawn. The influential work of Myerson [9] showed that applying the VCG mechanism using virtual valuations of bidders, computed using the valuations distribution, yields auctions that are both optimal and strategyproof. Relaxing the strong assumption on bidder valuation knowledge, Goldberg et al. [4] borrow techniques from the analysis of online algorithms to design optimal auctions. They show that no strategyproof and optimal auction exists in the paradigm of deterministic algorithms. Instead, they resort to randomized mechanisms, and show how a constant ratio of the optimal revenue can be recovered in expectation, within the context of selling digital goods with unlimited supply [4] .
III. PRELIMINARIES
This work concerns auction design in the secondary spectrum market, where the primary user is the auctioneer, and secondary users are bidding agents. The spectrum for auction is divided into a set K of channels, numbered 1, . . . , K. The interference graph G = (S, E) models the interference among the set of agents, denoted S. Two agents i, j ∈ S interfere if they are assigned the same channel k ∈ K, and (i, j) ∈ E. The presence of edge (i, j) depends on the physical distance between i and j, and their transmitting power.
The auctioneer wishes to design an auction that allocates channels in an interference-free manner, and charges judiciously set prices to maximize total revenue. A feasible channel assignment scheme is a function f :
If f (i) = 0, then agent i has not been allocated a channel. A binary variable x i to indicates whether agent i is assigned a channel:
Each agent i ∈ S has a valuation v i ∈ Q + for obtaining a channel, which is private information known only to itself. Here v i can be interpreted in monetary terms, indicating the max amount agent i is willing to pay for a channel. We focus on the prior-free setting [4] , in which no information on the distribution of the set of valuations {v i } is available. The revenue generating properties of the auction designed in this work hold for any distribution of agent valuations.
An agent i who 'wins', i.e. is allocated a channel, is charged a payment p i by the auctioneer. Each agent i is assumed to be selfish and rational [7] , trying to maximize its utility u i :
In the spectrum auction, each agent is required to disclose its valuation v i at the beginning of the auction. Agents may choose to mis-report their true valuation. We use b i to denote agent i's bid. The vector of bids by all agents is b, while the vector b −i denotes the bids of all agents excluding i.
Since the outcome of an auction is a function of all agents' bids, we can denote agent i's utility as u i (b i , b −i ) to more precisely reflect this. An auction is dominant-strategy truthful if reporting the true valuation is the dominant strategy for an 
If the latter only holds in expectation, then the mechanism is said to be strategyproof in expectation.
Due to space constraints, we will omit the proofs for a number of technical results throughout this paper. We urge the interested reader to refer to the full version of this paper for details [5] .
IV. PHASE 2: REVENUE MAXIMIZATION WITHOUT INTERFERENCE
Our strategy towards a revenue maximizing auction with interference-free property is to design a two-phase auction. In phase 1, we focus on computing a feasible (interferencefree) channel assignment, such that the potential revenue from agents with winning potential, who advance into phase 2. A randomized mechanism in phase 2 further computes the set of true winners, maximizing the revenue gleaned. We first ensure that the strategyproof property holds individually for each phase, and later describe a method that guarantees the overall protocol is truthful over both phases.
We will focus on phase 2 in this section, and discuss phase 1 later. Within this section, we assume |K| = |S|, i.e., there are as many channels as agents. Consequently, we can safely ignore interference effects (a feasible channel assignment can be found trivially), and focus on extracting the maximum revenue. In Sec. V, we will show how to compute an interference-free channel assignment in a strategyproof fashion, without compromising the revenue guarantees made in this section.
A. Optimal Pricing and Revenue Benchmark
We will design a revenue-maximizing mechanism that takes as input a set of agents for which a feasible assignment has already been found, denoted as P. Hence, all agents in P may feasibly be declared winners in the auction, though such an outcome will most likely yield revenue that is arbitrarily far from optimal. We sort agents in P by their valuation, so that v i ≥ v j for all i ≤ j. Since every agent can be feasibly assigned a channel, the price that maximizes revenue is p = arg max
Similarly, the optimal single-price revenue, R (1) , is:
In the assumed prior-free setting, the auctioneer has no information on the distribution of agent valuations in P. The first obstacle in such a setting is to design a mechanism that can 'guess' the optimal price to charge agents. Setting p either too high or too low may lose revenue. The lack of information on user valuations can be remedied if we use a subset of bids as a sample, to gain a good estimate on the optimal revenue maximizing price p. We can then offer channels at the price p, but only to agents whose bids were not sampled, thus discarding the potential revenue from this sampled subset of agents. One can then show that since the price offered to each agent is not a function of its bid, this mechanism is indeed strategyproof [5] .
The second obstacle in the prior-free setting is deciding a suitable revenue benchmark, to compare the revenue obtained by our mechanism with. The single-price revenue of Eq. (3) has the advantage that one can design strategyproof mechanisms to extract a constant amount of this revenue. However, in the case that the maximum revenue R (1) of Eq. (3) is obtained by allocating a channel to only one bidder, it is impossible for any strategyproof auction to generate a constant fraction of R (1) [4] . Consequently, we will adopt the previous convention in prior-free auctions and consider as our benchmark the revenue obtained from the single-price auction where at least two agents are allocated [4] . Formally, this is defined as:
B. A Revenue-Maximizing Randomized Auction
A key ingredient of our revenue-maximizing mechanism is a profit extraction procedure, shown in Alg. 1. It takes as input a set of agents A, and a target revenue R. It attempts to compute a subset of agents that are able to share R equally, through gradual elimination of agents that are unable to afford the offered price R |A| . First, the procedure is strategyproof, since the offer price is a function of a fixed R and the number of remaining agents in A, and is independent of agents' bids. Second, if R * is the optimal single-price revenue of Eq. (3) that can be extracted from the set of agents A, then clearly the procedure will successfully extract R * from A if and only if the target revenue R ≤ R * . Alg. 1 is similar to the profit extraction method of Goldberg et al. but assumes offer price is descending in every round instead of ascending. We will see later that this subtle modification is crucial towards ensuring that the iterative partitioning auction we later design is strategyproof in expectation.
Armed with this profit extraction procedure, we are ready to describe our mechanism, shown in Alg. 2. The mechanism begins by randomly partitioning the set of agents P into two sets, A and B. It computes the optimal revenue for each set R A and R B based on the submitted bids of agents, using Eq. (3). The mechanism then attempts to extract R A from B, and vice versa, using the mechanism of Alg. 1. Since agents in one partition is offered a price that depends on the optimal revenue computed on the other partition, the price is bid independent for all agents, and thus the mechanism is strategyproof at this point. Since we must have either R A ≥ R B or R B ≥ R A , we are guaranteed from the properties of Alg. 1 that at least
Algorithm 2: Iterative Random Partitioning Mechanism
Input: Set of agents, P Output: Total revenue R 1 Initialize R := 0 2 Randomly partition bidders in P to two sets, A and B 3 Compute optimal price and revenue for sets A and B using Eq.
(2) and Eq. (3). Let RA and RB denote the revenue from sets A and B respectively 4 Run Alg. 1 on A (resp. B) using target revenue RB (resp. RA) 5 Let R be revenue gained from running Alg. 1 successfully 6 Set R := R + R 7 Let P denote one of two sets A and B from which Alg. 1 failed to raise any revenue 8 If |P | > 1, set P := P . Repeat from step 2 9 Otherwise return R one partition will yield revenue, specifically the minimum of (R A , R B ). If Alg. 1 successfully extracts R B (R A ) from A (B), then we assign channels to the winning bidders in this partition at the prices computed by the profit extraction procedure. We repeat the entire process, but considering only bidders from the partition that did not yield any revenue during the profit extraction phase. In the full version of this paper, we show that the choice of agents that participate in the next round, together with the fact that Alg. 1 offers in descending order, leads to a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation [5] . We next state our main theorem, which gives us a guarantee on the revenue obtained by Alg. 2: Theorem 1. The expected revenue generated by Alg. 2 is given by R (2) (
is the optimal singleprice revenue when agent valuations are known exactly, and n = |P|.
V. PHASE 1: STRATEGYPROOF INTERFERENCE-FREE CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT
In this section, we will design a mechanism that employs any given graph colouring algorithm (which we will denote by A), for computing channel assignments in a strategyproof fashion, such that the potential revenue to be gained from the second phase of the protocol is not compromised. Consider the case when all agents have the same valuation. Then finding a revenue-maximizing feasible assignment would be equivalent to maximizing the number of agents that can be feasibly allocated a channel. Given an interference graph and a fixed number of available channels, this reduces to the well known Maximum-K-Colourable Induced Subgraph problem (MAX-K-CIS). More formally, given a graph G and a set of colours K, the MAX-K-CIS problem is that of computing a subgraph H of G that can be coloured with at most |K| colours, such that the number of vertices in H is maximized.
Of course, agents do not all share the same valuation for obtaining a channel. In this case, the naive approach would be to consider solving the weighted version of MAX-K-CIS, where the goal is to find a K-colorable subgraph of G such that the sum of agent valuations in the subgraph is maximized. This appears to be a reasonable approach, since the sum of agent valuations provides an upper bound on the amount of revenue Algorithm 3: Algorithm for finding an interference free channel assignment that maximizes revenue R Input: Interference graph G, an algorithm A for the Max-K-CIS problem, set of channels K Output: A channel assignment f * , allocated agents W * , such that single-price revenue R * is maximized 
18 Output (R * , W * , T * ) and f * ;
that can be extracted. However, it turns out that such a solution surprisingly does not maximize the single-price revenue of Eq. (3) (we refer the reader to the full paper for details [5] ).
Observe that when a price p is fixed, we need to assign channels to as many agents as feasible whose valuations v i ≥ p, in order to maximize Eq. (3). That is, it is sufficient to solve the MAX-K-CIS problem on the interference graph induced on the subset of agents with v i ≥ p. If W is the set of agents successfully assigned a channel by some algorithm A, then the maximum single-price revenue available from this set is given as |W|p.
From Eq. (2), we know that the optimal price p * can only take on finitely many values, specifically, a value v i for some i ∈ S. This immediately points to a simple recipe for computing an assignment that maximizes revenue. Repeatedly run A on the subgraph of G induced by agents with valuation at least p, for each threshold price p = v 1 . . . v n , where n = |S|. If W p is the set of agents that can be feasibly allocated a channel by A when the threshold price is p, then the revenue at this price is simply p|W p |.
We detail the procedure for computing a revenuemaximizing assignment in Alg. 3. The algorithm takes as input the interference graph G, the set of channels K, as well as an algorithm A for solving MAX-K-CIS. The algorithm operates on a base set of agents T , where T = S initially. In subsequent iterations, T = S \ i, for each i, i.e., we also compute the optimal revenue available without the participation of each agent i. This allows us to measure the externality [11] imposed by each agent i on other agents. Later, we show how this information is essential in the design of a payment scheme to ensure strategyproofness is preserved during this phase.
For each such base set of agents, a threshold price p = v i is fixed for some valuation v i such that i ∈ T , and a subgraph 
is induced on G consisting only of agents in the base set T , whose valuations are at least p. The algorithm A is then used to compute a channel assignment f , such that the number of agents that can be feasibly assigned K channels is maximized. Let W be the set of agents allocated a channel by A. The outcome of each iteration is stored as a triple (R, W, T ) with revenue R, set of allocated agents W, and the base set of agents T . At the end, the algorithm returns the outcome that achieves the highest revenue R as the final solution.
While Alg. 3 is fairly straightforward, we have so far neglected the implications of strategic behaviour by agents. Alg. 3 works only when agents bid truthfully, i.e. b i = v i for all i. Alg. 3 can, however, be made strategyproof with the design an of accompanying payment scheme. Each agent i will be charged a payment p i , such that the dominant strategy for each agent is to bid truthfully when Alg. 3 is used to compute channel allocations. We note that the classic VCG payment scheme [11] cannot be used in this setting, since the metric to maximize is not the total valuation of agents. Instead, our payment scheme must be tailored specifically for use with Alg. 3. Alg. 4 shows our protocol for computing agent payments. The algorithm takes as input the set of solutions O as computed by Alg. 3. It then computes the quantity R −i as:
That is, R −i is the maximum achievable revenue when agent i is not part of the base set T . It is now clear why we computed the maximum revenue available without each agent i in Alg. 3. We say an outcome (R i , W i , T i ) ∈ O is a critical outcome for agent i if and only if the three conditions hold: (i) i ∈ W i , (ii) R i ≥ R −i , and (iii) For any other outcome (R i , W i , T i ) ∈ O if R i ≥ R −i and i ∈ W i , then R i ≥ R i . Hence, the critical outcome of some agent i is one that achieves at least as much revenue as the highest revenue generated without agent i's participation, and further this revenue is the smallest of all such outcomes. In the full version of the paper, we prove that under the payment scheme of Alg. 4 it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report its true valuation [5] .
VI. STRATEGYPROOFNESS OVER PHASES 1 AND 2 COMBINED We now retrospectively take a look at the two phases of the auction protocol, designed separately, and explain how they work in concert with each other. In the first phase, we compute a revenue-maximizing assignment using Alg. 3. We then proceed to compute the payments required to ensure this phase is strategyproof using Alg. 4. Let q denote the vector of payments as computed by Alg. 4. The set of agents assigned a channel by Alg. 3 in the first phase then participate in the second phase, which is the iterative randomized partitioning mechanism shown in Alg. 2. Let p be the prices offered to the agents who are winners at the end of Alg. 2. The auctioneer will allocate channels to this set of agents, and each agent in this set is charged a final price of max(p i , q i ). It is not hard to see that the mechanism is now strategyproof over both phases.
VII. CONCLUSION
We design a randomized, 2-phase auction protocol for secondary spectrum auctions. Unlike previous work, we focus on revenue maximization in the prior-free setting. Our auction improve the revenue guarantee of previous techniquesanalysis of the auction shows that it is both strategyproof, and asymptotically achieves a 1 3 -fraction of the optimal revenue in expectation.
